Post-Algebraic Key Exchange: Way Beyond Post-Quantum

For decades, cryptographic security has depended on algebra. Whether it’s factoring large primes, computing discrete logarithms, or solving structured lattice problems, most encryption systems rely on the hardness of mathematical problems. This includes not only traditional protocols like RSA and Diffie–Hellman, but also newer post-quantum candidates like Kyber, which is based on structured lattices and modular polynomials.

But all of these systems share a common vulnerability: they can be attacked by algorithms that exploit their underlying mathematical structures. Shor’s algorithm, for instance, breaks RSA and elliptic curve cryptography on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer. And even the most promising lattice-based systems are still fundamentally mathematical, meaning they remain within reach of future algebraic attacks, whether quantum or classical.

This raises a natural question: what if we moved beyond algebra entirely? What if our cryptographic systems didn’t rely on math at all—not even hard math, just no math?

This is the foundation of a new concept: post-algebraic key exchange. Rather than depending on structured mathematical problems to secure a key exchange, post-algebraic systems like CollapseRAM derive shared secrets from symbolic logic, entropy, and ephemeral memory behavior. These systems don’t use exponentiation, modular arithmetic, or polynomial operations. Instead, they use entropy inputs—such as time-stamped randomness—combined with symbolic memory registers that collapse in a one-time, irreversible way.

Here’s how it works in practice. Each party generates a blob of entropy, such as a SHA256 hash of current time, a device-specific fingerprint, and some randomness. They then derive a symbolic register based on a shared seed or session context. This register doesn’t store values in the usual sense—it represents a symbolic structure that collapses when read. Both parties combine their entropy blobs, hash them, and use that combined value to collapse the register. The result is a shared key. But—and this is key—once the collapse occurs, the register is consumed. It can’t be read again. It can’t be reused. This is known as “write-once, read-once” or WORO memory logic.

Because there’s no algebra involved, there’s nothing to invert. No equation to solve. No structure to attack. Even if an attacker records the entropy blobs, they cannot retroactively reconstruct the symbolic register or the exact collapse behavior unless they had access to it before it collapsed.

This makes post-algebraic systems fundamentally different from—and arguably more resilient than—existing cryptographic schemes. They are not just post-quantum. They are post-algebraic. They do not attempt to resist mathematical inversion. They avoid it altogether.

CollapseRAM is currently the leading example of this paradigm. It enforces ephemeral key exchange by design. It produces keys that are bound to entropy and symbolic state, not to algebraic coordinates. It’s fast, lightweight, memory-driven, and doesn’t require any special hardware to operate. In use cases where key reuse is dangerous or long-term storage of private keys is risky—such as in zero-trust environments, stateless servers, or secure enclave communication—post-algebraic systems offer real and practical benefits.

There’s still much work to be done. We need formal security models for these kinds of systems, and new analysis tools that don’t rely on algebraic reasoning. But the promise is clear. If cryptography is going to survive the coming decades, it may not just need to evolve beyond current mathematics. It may need to leave math behind altogether.

CollapseRAM is one step in that direction.

PATENT PENDING

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